2 March, 2026
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20 minutes to read
When Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán finally gave voice to what had long been slow-steaming in his mind – that “Ukraine is an enemy of Hungary” – the statement was promptly echoed by the chorus of Georgian Dream-affiliated media, amplified by numerous social media accounts linked with the ruling party. But while Georgian Dream (GD) higher-ups refrained from peddling the message themselves, the underlying sentiment was unmistakably there – that they, too, share the spirit of Orbán’s position.
The Georgian Dream and its affiliates have rarely missed an opportunity to disparage Kyiv. Ever since the Russians rolled their tanks deeper into Ukraine, Georgia’s relations with its erstwhile ally have soured and degenerated into a steady stream of verbal assaults on Ukrainian politicians. Four years since the outbreak of the all-out war, what was once a flourishing bilateral relationship is now strained, bitter, and often openly hostile.
GD politicians bear the lion’s share of the responsibility for this. In GD messaging to Georgians, Ukraine under President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was portrayed as Tbilisi’s political antipode: a Western-aligned government that has recklessly wrecked the country instead of seeking accommodation with the Kremlin. The opposition also paints GD in comparison to the Ukrainian leadership: not democrats and patriots, but a small group of opportunistic politicians focused on preserving their master’s wealth while disregarding popular opinion and long-term national interests.
But squabbles aside, few have asked whether, and indeed could, Georgia’s policy have been fundamentally different had another political party been steering the wheel? Answering this question is not merely a matter of academic curiosity; it also has practical significance. Much of GD’s propaganda rests on the argument that Tbilisi’s current stance has no alternative, given the country’s vulnerable geopolitical position and the persisting Russian occupation of its lands. Therefore, addressing these questions – even if only post factum – remains a crucial exercise for understanding where small states find themselves in this geopolitical conflagration.
As with any other counterfactual analysis, establishing a clear stopping point is essential for a realistic assessment of what could have been achieved – and what could not – at a given point in time. For this article, we set February 2022 as the cutoff date, holding constant everything that preceded the full-scale invasion. In other words, the only variable that changes is the government itself: we assume that when Russia invades Ukraine, the Georgian Dream party is no longer in power and is replaced by an alternative, more pro-Western leadership. Any such government would need to take the inventory, and so do we.
Georgia faced Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 without external security guarantees. The country maintained a nominal pro-Western orientation, but its international position was significantly weakened by years of democratic backsliding.
First, Georgia faced Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 without external security guarantees. The country maintained a nominal pro-Western orientation, but its international position was significantly weakened by years of democratic backsliding. Georgia had already achieved major milestones such as the Association Agreement (AA) and Visa Liberalization with the EU, but relations had lost momentum, particularly after failed EU mediation efforts in 2021 to resolve the post-election impasse. In the U.S.-Georgia relations, there is also not much to brag about, as the Strategic Partnership Charter, in force since 2009, has become a largely symbolic vehicle, failing to translate into either deeper economic and trade relations or more intensive business and people-to-people ties. Plus, the U.S. focus on the human rights violations has alienated Washington and Tbilisi.
Second, Georgia faced the Russian offensive in Ukraine militarily weak, perhaps the weakest it had been in recent history. Low military spending (1.68% of GDP) and a limited number of personnel (around 15,000 combat-ready soldiers), combined with the open and tacit persecution of military officials and officers from the previous United National Movement (UNM) administration, had severely undermined the fighting spirit and combat-readiness of the armed forces. We now know, as GD’s own investigations revealed, that corruption under the GD-appointed ministers of defense was widespread, further sapping the military’s resources.
Third, and a closely interlinked factor, societal resolve – or the willingness of the population to take up arms or otherwise resist a potential invasion – was also minimal. By 2022, the then-deputy head of the parliamentary defense committee and a former chief of the armed forces under the GD government, Vladimer Chachibaia, warned that Georgian society was in a state of “depletion” and “fatigue.”
The penetration of Russia-friendly actors into public institutions, security agencies, and the social fabric had reached unprecedented levels. Never before had Kremlin-endorsed political and media figures been so emboldened in public space as in the period leading up to February 2022.
Fourth, the penetration of Russia-friendly actors into public institutions, security agencies, and the social fabric had reached unprecedented levels. Never before had Kremlin-endorsed political and media figures been so emboldened in public space as in the period leading up to February 2022. For years, GD favored a greater opening to Russia, and pro-Russian actors were paraded on government-affiliated media, with their discourse permeating the domestic political debate and systematically undermining the country’s pro-Western orientation. Therefore, even if a new government were able to remove compromised mid-level and top officials, the problem of Russian penetration would persist for years.
Fifth, serious issues exist with cohesion, both in people-to-people relations and in the relationship between citizens and the state. Years of pressure on dissenting views, along with the stigmatization of minorities, civil society actors, and political figures, including by pro-Russian actors, have created an abyss of partisan polarization among Georgians.
14 years prior, Georgia had faced a Russian invasion, with 20% of its territory still under occupation, including areas near key economic arteries. Tbilisi, the country’s largest city, political center, and economic powerhouse, has been – since August 2008 – within artillery range of the nearest Russian military base in Akhalgori.
Sixth, 14 years prior, Georgia had faced a Russian invasion, with 20% of its territory still under occupation, including areas near key economic arteries. Tbilisi, the country’s largest city, political center, and economic powerhouse, has been – since August 2008 – within artillery range of the nearest Russian military base in Akhalgori. Although the military situation had been largely frozen since 2008, frequent civilian detentions along the occupation lines with Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia created an atmosphere of uncertainty and latent tension. The number of Russian personnel in the two regions had halved to an estimated 2,500 due to their redeployment to Ukraine, and deterring their attack was well within the capabilities of the Georgian armed forces, even in their weakened state. Yet the widely publicized images of aerial bombardments and terrestrial invasion of Ukraine amplified public anxiety, reviving the deep-rooted trauma of the 2008 war and heightening psychological vulnerability.
All in all, this leaves us with an uncomfortable truth: by the outbreak of an all-out war, the GD’s ten years of governance would have placed any government in an extremely precarious state – without meaningful support from the West, with weakened democratic credentials, fragile military, and a deeply divided society.
First reactions of GD in February 2022 – refusal to join sanctions against Russia and the decision not to green-light a charter flight carrying Georgian volunteers to Warsaw shortly after the outbreak of war – may appear, when viewed against the structural constraints of occupation the party inherited in 2012, as well as the vulnerabilities it later created or amplified, as a logical reflection of this uncomfortable reality. This was certainly the message the GD speakers tried to convey in their press engagements in the aftermath of the invasion. Prudence and rationalism, they insisted, were what defined Tbilisi’s chosen path of non-interference. Quite naturally, they did not dwell on the fact that a large part of that vulnerability was of their own doing.
On the contrary, GD tapped into the fear of a renewed Russian invasion and amplified real vulnerability to the political message of impotence. “It will take them a few minutes to turn Georgia upside down,” warned then Foreign Minister Davit Zalkaliani in a fiery speech on February 28, 2022. Further leaning into that narrative, the Georgian Dream has weaponized the fear of war: it campaigned as a party of peace and stability against the hypothetical catch-all “war party” (lumping together the opposition, CSOs, media, the EU, and the U.S.) in the 2024 parliamentary elections.
The GD, however, chose the opposite path – once a quick Russian victory was out of the question, rather than adjusting, it escalated rhetorically against the West and Ukraine, accusing them of seeking to drag Georgia into a confrontation with Russia.
Our hypothetical government would have been similarly cautious in its actions at the outset of hostilities, while recognizing people’s fears, would have led the discourse in a way that united society and quelled these anxieties, compensating for critical flaws in social and political cohesion. That kind of approach would have created a much wider berth for maneuver once it became apparent that Ukraine was holding firm, and international condemnation of the Russian aggression was massive. The GD, however, chose the opposite path – once a quick Russian victory was out of the question, rather than adjusting, it escalated rhetorically against the West and Ukraine, accusing them of seeking to drag Georgia into a confrontation with Russia. It soon became evident that feigned rationality was only a smokescreen: much of what the ruling party was doing was the product of subjective (and self-interested) political choice rather than the inevitable outcome of structural constraints.
While Georgia’s structural vulnerabilities demanded sober strategic reckoning in 2022, they should under no circumstances have deprived the country of its agency. Absent a concerted effort to strengthen Georgia’s military capabilities, the ad nauseam invocation of weakness and stoking fear amounted less to prudent statecraft than to a declaration of self-resignation, or worse – readiness to surrender without even resisting. The truth is, GD was picking the (Russian) side, rather than staying prudently cautious.
This became evident in GD’s decision not to facilitate organized intake of Ukrainian refugees, while simultaneously opening the borders to hundreds of thousands of Russians. Once again, a preference for financial profit (Russian war migrants left homes with their cash, as opposed to the Ukrainian refugees) trumped moral and humanitarian obligation. Similarly, the choice to refrain from imposing most sanctions – framed by party mouthpieces as a pragmatic move – appeared driven less by prudence about possible Russian retaliation than by the opportunities of war profiteering.
The campaign against Ukraine was too visceral, pervasive, and consistent to be attributed solely, or even mainly, to party-political frictions, for instance, regarding the role of 3rd President, Mikheil Saakashvili, in Ukraine, or the role Ukraine allegedly played in Saakashvili’s return to Georgia. Rather, it reflected a deep dislike of Ukraine’s actions and a consistent effort to dampen popular support for Ukraine in Georgia, a sort of “vice signaling” to the Kremlin, aimed at creating space for accommodation.
From the moral standpoint, nothing could justify blaming Ukraine for provoking the war, or insisting that Georgian fighters were only mercenaries hired for money, or threatening to cancel their Georgian citizenship. Demonization of Ukrainian leaders, displaying campaign banners depicting a contrast between the ruins of Ukrainian cities alongside shiny Georgian ones, can by no means be considered pragmatic prudence. All of that was completely avoidable and, in fact, should have been avoided.
Now that we have established the factual circumstances, including both the structural constraints Tbilisi faced at the time of the all-out invasion and the subjective political choices it has, in fact, made, we can turn to the core question of our analysis: what a new political force could have done more to support Ukraine.
GD policy choices made in response to the invasion of Ukraine did not reflect the dominant public mood but went expressly against it, stoking emotions and strengthening fringe opinions.
Let us look at the simple political fact: GD policy choices made in response to the invasion of Ukraine did not reflect the dominant public mood but went expressly against it, stoking emotions and strengthening fringe opinions. The reality is that anyone at the helm of Georgia in 2022 would possess an unprecedentedly strong popular mandate to do more for Ukraine.
A March 2022 survey by the Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC) found that 32% of respondents believed the authorities’ support for Ukraine was sufficient, while an additional 61% stated that more support was needed. Importantly, this backing extended across a wide range of measures. An overwhelming 97% found it acceptable to provide humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, such as food and medicine; 96% supported accepting Ukrainian refugees; and 91% approved of providing financial assistance. More sensitive steps also commanded majority backing: 66% found it acceptable to allow Georgian volunteers to travel to Ukraine to fight; 59% favored restricting the entry of Russian citizens into Georgia; and 53% supported supplying Ukraine with weapons and armament.
There was also a strong case for moral obligation: Ukrainians were there for Georgia twice when no one else showed up: as volunteer fighters in the war in Abkhazia, and by providing critical helicopters and ships that evacuated thousands of ethnic Georgians from besieged Sokhumi and Kodori valley, saving their lives. Ukrainian military advisors stood next to Georgia also in 2008, instructing operators of air defense systems that inflicted heavy losses on Russian aircraft, and President Viktor Yushchenko came to Tbilisi immediately after the war with other Eastern European leaders. So, humanitarian law aside, Georgia had a moral obligation to reciprocate.
A hypothetical pro-Western government could have united the nation around doing more for Ukraine. A responsible government would have seen a unique opportunity to consolidate and heal the divisions that had long plagued the country, to restore a sense of agency in a virtuous cause, while also bolstering the country’s resilience. Without escalatory moves in the hard-security field to avoid unnecessary tensions with Russia, it could have offered greater political, moral, and humanitarian support to Ukraine.
There is a range of actions that Tbilisi could have taken:
Diplomatic support: Georgia has joined scores of resolutions, declarations, and statements in support of Ukraine, but over time, even this rhetorical alignment appears to have diminished. What truly mattered – and what could have served as a tangible political signal – were regular high-level visits to Ukraine. To this day, only the Parliamentary Speaker Shalva Papuashvili has traveled to Kyiv once, accompanied by a group of opposition lawmakers. That visit, too, was conducted in April 2022, significantly later than those of other European delegations, and ended without any major political rapprochement. An attempt by 5th President Salome Zourabichvili to visit Ukraine was reportedly intercepted by GD officials, who threatened to impeach her if she went ahead.
Cracking down on sanctions evasion: Even if full-scale, comprehensive sanctions would not have been justifiable – not least given the country’s fragile economic situation – Tbilisi still had room to commit to targeted restrictions, particularly on dual-use items. These restrictions should have been enforced rigorously and without exception. Contrary to the claims by GD officials, Georgia’s adherence to a ban on dual-purpose goods would demonstrate its commitment to non-interference rather than provoke a military response from Moscow. Crucially, the initiative to demonstrate that no illicit trade was occurring should have rested with Tbilisi. To foster a broader political consensus, the task of monitoring sanctions could have been entrusted to a parliamentary committee or a figure acceptable across party lines and partners, ensuring both credibility and accountability.
Stronger border controls: Stronger filters could have been applied to persons entering the country from both Russia and Ukraine, particularly those coming from the occupied regions of Ukraine. With Russians, priority entry should have been given to opposition members, genuine defectors, and those who openly opposed the war. Individuals implicated in human rights violations or in facilitating financial flows to the Russian budget would have been blacklisted. Travel bans would have been enforced on anyone already sanctioned by Ukraine, the EU, or other Western partners, as well as those who had previously violated Georgia’s Law on the Occupied Territories. In parallel, Georgia would have worked to ensure that its own sanctions lists were upheld abroad.
Humanitarian efforts: Support would have been extended to accommodate a greater number of Ukrainian refugees (according to official statistics, an estimated 28,000 entered Georgia, largely in an uncoordinated manner) with simplified resettlement procedures put in place. Additionally, a special financial mechanism could have been adopted to earmark a share of revenues from increased trade with Russia for humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. A responsible government would have built on the goodwill with Kyiv and worked closely with Ukrainian counterparts on facilitating the exchange of Georgian prisoners of war held in Russian captivity.
Dual-use assistance: Non-lethal equipment, such as helmets, vests, and medical kits, could have been provided to Ukraine without any restrictions early on, while simultaneously replenishing depleted domestic stocks and replacing outdated weaponry through the armor replacement program (preferably with the U.S. serving as the intermediary). The military and security expertise at the Georgian embassy in Kyiv would have been strengthened, alongside the deployment of medical crews and electricity specialists to support critical infrastructure. Additionally, rehabilitation programs for wounded Georgian and Ukrainian soldiers would have been established.
Military/security preparedness: A responsible government would have seen multiple opportunities to reduce vulnerabilities associated with the persistent occupation of Georgian territories by improving the country’s long-term strategic position. Many countries have benefited from NATO’s armor replacement programs – older but battle-tested MBT T-72s and BMPs were sent to Ukraine, while the U.S. and European allies replaced old Soviet hardware with NATO-compatible equipment. Even the simple process of negotiating would have partially restored frayed relations with the Western/NATO allies. If successful, this deal could have been a boon for Georgia’s forces, whose armored battlefield mobility has been rather limited. If, however, this was judged too aggressive, too costly, or too impracticable, a decisive move could have been made to radically upgrade defensive air surveillance and air defense capabilities, which have long constituted a major gap. Given that Russia’s strategic bombing fleet operated over the Caspian Sea, launching cruise missiles on Ukraine, this could have been useful for Georgia to avoid potential emergencies, both deliberate and unintended. Importantly, since Georgia’s existing military radars are already integrated into the NATO command, this could not have been construed as a radical change in policy or posture. Instead, one can infer from recent GD statements that precise suggestions from Western partners in these two domains may have given rise to the conspiracy that the West was “dragging Georgia into war.” Experience and learning of Georgian fighters in Ukraine could have been integrated directly (without PR fanfare) into the Military Academy of Georgia throughout the course of the war.
In parallel, genuine progress would have been made on Georgia’s territorial defense and civil preparedness, as well as on defense decentralization and small-unit autonomy. Programs and interventions on these matters would have drawn lessons from Ukraine’s experience. Infrastructure development, particularly in the southern regions near the country’s only border with a NATO member state, Türkiye, would have been prioritized to enhance both mobility and defense.
International platforms: The full-scale invasion of Ukraine has strengthened Georgia’s long-held position on the Kremlin’s fundamentally aggressive designs, but further Georgian efforts could have helped fully alleviate post-2008 skepticism about Georgia’s conduct in the Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia, fueled by the notorious Tagliavini Report. The Georgian diplomacy could have worked to tie in the issue of Russia’s failure to fully implement the 2008 ceasefire in the ongoing peace talks, as well as to request the removal of Russian military forces from the two regions. In parallel, active opposition to the recruitment of Abkhaz and Ossetian residents into Russian armed forces could have become one of the “soft power” messages tailored towards its estranged citizens.
An impartial look at the state of Georgia in February 2022 reveals a weakened nation beset by partisan divisions. The citizens exhibited overwhelming support towards Ukraine, but underlying fears about the possibility of renewed hostilities were persistent. For a truly pragmatic government in Georgia, this would have created an opportunity to heal societal tensions and manage long-held anxieties. Offering support to Ukraine, a country that shared a similar fate not long ago, could have represented a cathartic moment to rally the nation.
Throughout the four years while the war is raging in Ukraine, Georgia’s leadership has been blinded by its own starry-eyed vision of Russia as an all-powerful actor, while the reality has been quite the opposite – Russia is being bled hard in Ukraine, and its economy is in a crisis. True, it remains dangerous for Georgia, but deeper integration with the pariah state is hardly a pragmatic move, politically or economically, especially when a panoply of relatively non-aggressive alternatives existed. Through showing a higher degree of solidarity to Ukraine, Georgians could have rebuilt ties with Eastern Europeans with whom they traditionally shared skepticism towards the Kremlin and, personally, towards Vladimir Putin. In contrast to 2008, when Tbilisi’s case was effectively dismissed, the invasion of Ukraine sharpened the sense of guilt – arguably a potent tool to also incentivize Western European leaders to do more for Georgia, to bolster its security and resilience. A once-in-a-generation opportunity created by the EU membership perspective could have been exploited more fully and much faster from the vantage point of 2022, instead of being run into the ground by 2025.
A significant opportunity was missed to strengthen the country’s defenses. In a world dominated by transactional relations, solidifying values-based bonds with Ukraine and its allies would cultivate a stronger sense of battlefield kinship. The war-tested friendship with Ukraine would grant Georgians what they have always sought – an unconditional ally who would stand with them in both peace and crisis. Having close ties with Ukraine – a country with one of the largest and most potent militaries in Europe – could also serve as an unconventional form of deterrence. Almost 2,000 Georgians stood shoulder to shoulder with Ukrainians at the height of tensions in February-March 2022, and up to a thousand continue to do so to this day. One would assume that, should a proportionate number show up for Georgia in its hour of need, any would-be invader would think twice before pointing their guns at Tbilisi.
GD’s handling of Ukraine in the aftermath of the full-scale invasion is not only a matter of poor judgment and faulty calculations, but also a story of wasted time and missed opportunities. GD may have wanted to spin its policy choice as pragmatic, but if it was so, only in a narrow and self-serving way – to maximize profit and solidify its grasp on power.
In conclusion, GD’s handling of Ukraine in the aftermath of the full-scale invasion is not only a matter of poor judgment and faulty calculations, but also a story of wasted time and missed opportunities. GD may have wanted to spin its policy choice as pragmatic, but if it was so, only in a narrow and self-serving way – to maximize profit and solidify its grasp on power. True pragmatism could have brought Georgia together and made it stronger alongside more reliable partners, without resorting to unnecessary jingoism and gung-ho militarism.